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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GAMING DEVICES-PUBLIC POLICY
-- WHEN COURT MAY DETERMNE.-The West Virginia court
recently held that "a statute requiring a lieense tax of one
operating a gaming device prohibited by law is invalid and
unenforceable, as against public policy."1  Quaere: to what
extent may the courts determine what is public policy?IOlder writers believed that judges did not legislate at
all.2 Today there is danger of the other extreme-that the
law consists of the rules which the courts enforce and that
jhe courts are the real makers and creators of the law.3
Of course, the power to declare the law carries with it the
power to make the law when none exists.4 The common
law is and always has been the law of the courts.5
It is an elementary principle that neither of the three
,departments of our government is inferior to the others and
that they are separate and coordinate. The Constitution,
however, did establish a fundamental law and the courts
are bound by it. 6 The legislature has the inherent power
to formulate rules for conduct of persons within its juris-
diction so long as its enactments do not conflict with the
fundamental laws, and a court which is bound by a funda-
mental law must enforce the law as such. 7
"Obscurity of statute or of precedent or of customs or of
morals, or collision between some or all of them, may leave
the law unsettled and cast a duty upon the courts to declare
it retrospectively in the exercise of a power frankly legisla-
tive in function." s But where the legislature has passed a
statute, and if it does not contravene the fundamental law,
is a court justified in invalidating it? Numerous cases have
settled this point. Where a statute does not violate the
federal or state constitution, the legislative will is supreme
and its policy is not subject to review by the courts whose
Thompson v. Hall, 188 S. E. 579 (W. Va. 1927).
CARoozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 124.
Pope, "Fundamental Law and the Power of the Courts," 27 HARv. L. REV. 45.
'Su m, n. 2.
s Supra, n. 3.
Marbury V. Madison, 1 Cranch (U. S.) 137 (1803).
Idem
CARDOzO, su ra, n. 2, P. 128.
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province is not to regulate but to effectuate the policy of
the law as expressed in valid statutes.9 The justice or in-
justice of statutory provisions is a question for the legisla-
ture, and the courts will not declare a statute invalid be-
cause in their judgment it may be unwise or detrimental to
the best interests of the state.10 A legislative act, if con-
stitutional, declares in terms the policy of the state. The
courts are not at liberty to declare a law, void as in viola-
tion of public policy.11 As stated by Parke, B.: "It is the
province of the statesman and not of the lawyer to discuss
and of the legislature to determine what is best for the
public good and provide for it by proper enactments. It is
the province of the judge to expound the law, to declare
public policy as he finds it in the written and unwritten
law.,l
What is "public policy"? A survey of cases shows that
it is a variable term13 and that it varies with the habits and
fashions of the day. 4 The ultimate sovereignty in our
government consists of the will of the people who form the
government. As long as this ultimate sovereignty does
not partake of a character which is revolutionary, it ex-
presses itself in accordance with the laws of the land: this
is called constitutional government. Public policy is not to
be measured by the private convictions or notions of the
individual judge.5 The Virginia Court16 said that public
policy is wholly unreliable as a basis for judicial decision.
Like "natural law," it seems to be a catch-all for judicial
decision when couits can find no other reasoning.
Undolibtedly back of the process of formulated legisla-
tive policy is the force of public opinion, which is generally
not the opinion of a numerical majority but rather that of
an effective minority. 7 Individuals become interested in
laws, in the main, when they become affected by them.
Sunday Laws are enforced in some communities, because
N Davis v. Fla. Power Co., 64 Fla. 246. 60 So. 759 (1913) ; People V. Tompkins, 186
N. Y. 413, 79 N. E. 326 (1906).
" McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27 (1904) ; Bangor v. Pierce, 106 Me. 527, 76 Atl. 945
(1910).
,t Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agr., 222 U. S. 380 (1912) ; Board of Com-
missions v. Diamond Ice Co., 130 Ia. 603, 105 N. W. 203 (1905).
Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 122.
z Gordon v. Gordon Admrs., 168 Ky. 409, 182 S. W. 220 (1916).
14 Brown v. Speyers, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 296 (1871).
" Picket Pub. Co. v. Board of Com., 36 Mont. 188, 92 Pac. 524 (1907).
10 Boynton v. McNeal, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 464 (1879).
17 LOWELL, PuBLIc OPINION AND PoPuLAR GOVERNMENT, ch. 1.
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public opinion demands it; while in other communities, often
in close proximity, they are unenforced because of indiffer-
ence or because the public welfare requires it. The mores of
the day change the reason. No longer are Sunday Laws
enforced because of religious reasons but rather because
they are necessary for both the physical and moral nature of
men. 8 The 18th Amendment but a few years ago expressed
public opinion as to prohibition. Today it is problematical
if the numerical majority favor it. "Where there is no
statute judicial legislation does, and should, keep its doc-
trines up to date with the mores by continual restatement and
by giving them a continually new content."' 9  But it is dif-
ferent where the rule has been established by legislative
enactment. Suppose, for instance, that a statute defines
murder, and then excuses the killing when done to atone
the violation of the chastity of the female members of the
family: would this not be a regulation of manslaughter?
Would the court have the power to nullify this exception in
the statute as being contrary to public policy?20
In the recent West Virginia case, the statute21 under dis-
cussion provided for the issuance of a license on punch boards
and expressly provided that no license or payment therefor
"shall be taken to legalize any act which would otherwise
be in violation of the law."
Assuming that the intention of the Legislature was to
tax an illegal act, can the court say that such an inten-
tion is against public policy and that therefore the tax itself
is void?
In the License Cases, where Congress authorized a tax
on liquor business in prohibition states the Supreme Court
said:
"This court cannot amend or modify any legislative
acts, examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as
politic or impolitic * * * * . The legislature has thought
fit, by enactments clear of all ambiguity, to impose penal-
ties for unlicensed dealing in lottery tickets and in liquor.
These enactments so long as they stand unrepealed und
unmodified, express the public policy in regard to the
subjects of them. The proposition that they are contrary
29 Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299 (1896).
Corbin, 29 YALE L. J. 771.
Olliphant, 65 CENT. L. J. 142.
CODE, ch. 32, §1.
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to public policy is a contradiction in terms, or it is intend-
ed as a denial of their expedience or their propriety * *
* * . These licenses give no authority. They are mere
receipts for taxes. ' 22
In a recent case2 where the defendants contended that
the laws of the State of Washington declare the public pol-
icy of the state, and since the sale of intoxicating liquor is
prohibited, the government of the United States would not
issue a permit or license in contravention of this law, be-
coming thereby a party to the violation, the court said:
"Comp. Stat. §5966 declaring the offense of engaging
in the liquor business without having-paid required reve-
nue tax, which payment shall not authorize the business
in any state contrary to its law, is applicable in a prohibi-
tion state."
But, while a statute which imposes a license tax upon a
particular form of gaming generally has the effect of legal-
izing that form of gaming upon the payment of the tax
imposed, a statute will be construed to legalize gaming only
when that is its reasonable or natural intendment.24 But,
in a Texas Case by express legislation the keeping or ex-
hibiting a table for purpose of gambling notwithstanding
such table may be licensed by law and license tax paid, is
an offense against the law of Texas.2
Cooley, J. said: "The idea that the state lends its coun-
tenance to any particular traffic by taxing it, seems to rest
upon a very transparent fallacy. * * * * Taxes are not
favors; they are burdens; * * * * Yet when the keeper of
billiard tables is compelled to pay a tax, it can be no de-
fense to him, either in law or in morals, that he is com-
pelled to do so from the profits of an illegal business. To
refuse to receive the tax under such circumstances would
tend to encourage the business, instead of restraining it;
and would tend to defeat the state policy which forbids
games of chance * * * * . If it were to act upon the idea
of refusing to derive a revenue from such sources, it ought
to decline to receive fines for criminal offenses with the
License Tax Cases, 5 WaUI. (U. S.) 462 (1866).
U. S. v. Lazzaro, 226 Fed. 237 (1918).
24 4 Ann. Cas. 576; State v. Duncan. 16 Lea (Tenn.) 79 (1885) ; Hawkins V.
State, 33 Ala. 433 (1859).
25 Reeves t. State. 12 Tex. App. 199 (1882); Parker v. State, 13 Tex. App. 213
(1882).
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same emphasis that it would refuse to collect a tax from
an obnoxious business * * * * *. If the tax is imposed on the
thing which is prohibited, the tax law instead of being in-
consistent with the law declaring the illegality is in entire
harmony with its general purpose and may sometimes be
even more effectual."' 28 That a business which is prohib-
ited may be taxed has been held by both state courts2 and
-very recently by the United States Supreme Court's decision
that the income -of a bootlegger could be taxed.28
The legislature legalized no act; its provisions were
punitive and pecuniary; therefore, it is difficult to see how
any public policy has been violated. The court believed
that the licensing of these gaming devices "had increased
rather than diminished the pernicious practice, because in
many instances, if not as a general rule, the criminal law is
not enforced against the operators of gaming devices hold-
ing licenses." It is dcubtful if, through practical experi-
ence, this statement can be substantiated. Certainly it is
unreasonable that one should violate the gaming device law
because the state has placed an additional penalty in way
of a license. The fact is true, as the court pointed out, that
violators are not prosecuted. But is that the fault of the
license law-the statute in question-or is it due to the fact
that local prosecuting attorneys and other public officials,
empowered wiih the right and duty to enforce the law, are
not performing their duty? It requires no interpretation
to see that the statute did not legalize any gambling- act;
and if public officers have, in the past "winked" at viola-
tions of this kind, what assurance do we have that this
"winking" will cease because the court has improperly leg-
islated judicially that the statute is invalid and inopera-
tive? Unless some action is taken by local officers, the
evil will continue, public policy will be violated, in some in-
stances public opinion satisfied, and the state will be de-
prived of a source of revenue.
It should be pointed out that the result of Thompson v. Hall
could be sustained on the theory that the plaintiff, operat-
ing an illegal device, did not come into a Court of Equity
' Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406 (1875).
SPalmer I. State, 88 Tenn. 553, 13 S. W. 233 (1890) Blaufleld w. State, 103
Tenn. 59-3, 53 S. W. 1090 (1899).
" U. S. v. Sullivan, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 607 (June, 1927).
zoo
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with clean hands. In announcing that the legislature had
violated the public policy of the State, it seems that the
Court has not discriminated between the functions of the
legislative and judicial departments.
-MoSE EDWIN BOIARSKY.
FUTURE INTERESTS-A FEE LIMITED UPON A FEE BY DEED
-HEIR CONSTRUED AS HEIR OF THE BoDY.-The grantors by
deed granted land to their daughter Laura, with a limita-
tion that should Laura die without an heir, the land to be
equally divided between James and William, sons of the
grantors. After conveying to her sister, Laura died. The
heirs of James and William brought ejectment against the
sister. Held, the limitation over to James and William
was valid. Laura took a qualified fee determinable upon
her death without heirs of the body then living. Kidwell v.
Rogerg, 137 S. E. 5 (W. Va. 1927).
At early common-law a fee could not be limited upon a
,fee. The only kinds of future interests that could be cre-
ated were in the form of remainders, and any limitation
operating to shift the seisin otherwise than as a remainder
expectant upon the determination of the preceding estate
was void. This rule, the common-law doctrine of repug-
nancy between two estates, was founded upon the assump-
tion that the conveyance of the fee was the conveyance of
the Whole, and after the whole was given there was noth-
ing beyond that left to give. However, with the passage
of the statute of uses and the statute of wills, the possibili-
ties of the creation of future estates were greatly enlarged.
Limitations after a fee by way of springing and shifting
uses came to be recognized. Ulterior estates were per-
mitted to be created to arise upon the defeasance of prior
estates in the same property, contrary to the strict rules of
the early common-law. Pells v. Brown, 3 Cro. Jac. 590, in-
troduced into the law the novel idea of indestructible con-
tingent future interests. This nondestructibility of such
contingent future estates, created under the statute of uses,
led to the growth of a-new doctrine in the law of property,
the so-called rule against perpetuities. The English and
nearly all of the American authorities sustain the view of
Pells v. Brown, and also hold that a gift over upon a definite
1I
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